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# SHAFTESBURY'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY

By Toshihiko HIRAI\*

## I. Genealogy of Shaftesbury's Ideas

The Enlightenment of the eighteenth century England originated with Shaftesbury no less than with Locke. If Locke was a thinker at the end of the seventeenth century, Shaftesbury may as well be called one active from about 1699 till 1713, standing, as it were, at the turning point from the seventeenth to the eighteenth century. Or one would rather appreciate the epoch-making significance he had toward the formation of the English philosophy of enlightenment, and more broadly, of English social sciences, and would regard the great influence he exerted upon the modern ideas of France and Germany, as Willey did when he said, "Shaftesbury is the typical English moralist of the Enlightenment, and is usually accounted the founder of the moral sense school."<sup>1)</sup>

In the first place, let us try to trace up the genealogy of Shaftesbury's ideas which have an important bearing upon the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. By doing so, we shall bring forward for later discussion those elements of Shaftesbury's ideas which we shall develop in this paper. Shaftesbury recognized moral sense as being innate in human nature itself. Human nature is not so simple as to suffer itself to be the sport of sense, acting at the beck and call of selfish desire. Man, as a social being, is endowed with such feelings as friendship or brotherly love or what we may call the social affection. The social affection, indeed, is only too natural to mankind. It is, so to speak, a natural affection. Thus, Shaftesbury was a "friend of man" through and through in that sense that he admitted that there dwells in human nature itself an innate sense of coexistence with others or the moral sense, and pleaded for the goodness of human nature.

Now, behind the process of establishing the moral ability of mankind lies a point of great importance from the stand-point of the history of modern bourgeois thought. That is, through his critique of two great ideas of the seventeenth century, namely the supernatural revelation of Puritanism and

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1) Willey, B., *The Eighteenth Century Background, Studies on the Idea of Nature in the Thought of the Period*, (London, 1957), p. 58.

the Hobbesian sensualistic image of selfish man, Shaftesbury resurrected the Renaissance image of man—and retrospectively, the image of man of remote antiquity—above the horizon of the Enlightenment of bourgeois of the eighteenth century. To speak of Puritanism in the first place, the idea burst upon early English bourgeois who opposed the ancient regime held by the Tories in complicity with Anglicanism upon the Puritan revolution. Although it grew into so strong a driving force as to change our history, it remained wrapped in age-old dogma. In Calvinism a pessimistic view of man was predominant in which man's nature was evil for his original sin. Therefore, men practice asceticism for repentance of sin, and only by doing so will men be reclaimed from sin by God. This self-denial of human nature became the ethos of bourgeois, and was esteemed highly as the spirit of capitalism. But Puritanism was dangled about by a strong distrust of men. To see Hobbes' image of men in the state of nature, we can see underneath human nature the image of such individuals seeking for the right of existence from motives of sensual desires. It is true that these individuals were modern men who came into existence by overthrowing the feudal system. But these individuals, as they were, were only hostile with one another. In the image of such individualistic men could we find no enthusiasms nor passion to create a new society. That is the reason why Hobbes had to deny human nature in the state of nature, and to qualify it from outside humanly nature in order to construct the bourgeois society.

These concepts of evil-natured men, original sin, or supernatural salvation were entirely different from the image of man of the eighteenth century Enlightenment, especially that of Shaftesbury. The movement to believe firmly in the goodness of natural man and to admit the throb of reason in their hearts had already been seen in the Renaissance.<sup>2)</sup> To reach God, man must depend not only upon the star-spangled Heaven, but also upon reason and emotions that are the common notions of the inner man. Goodness is innate in man, and man should be able to reach the patent truth of God if he only realizes it. In the seventeenth century, too, Cambridge Platonists who were in the wake of humanistic spirit of the Renaissance opposed determinedly Puritanism for its judging of men from supernatural revelation, and tried to explain faith from the common reason innate in all men. Here was given the foundation for natural religion which was seeking unity by overcoming the dissociation of reason and revelation. Shaftesbury contends that to believe in the goodness of human nature and manifest this belief is to have faith in

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2) Troeltsch, E., "Renaissance und Reformation," *Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte und Religionssoziologie*, (Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. IV, Tübingen, 1925), S. 272.

God; to him the moral sense of mankind is a true religion.<sup>3)</sup> In this respect one may safely say that the relation of accepted religions and morals was inverted, and the morality of bourgeois parted from old religions to become independent. In this way was the moral philosophy of English Enlightenment established on the basis of 'Autonomie des Sittlichen' by going through the process of freeing ethics from dogmatic authorities or supernatural salvation doctrines, as Troeltsch rightly said.<sup>4)</sup>

Now, there was something that was supporting the enlightening moral sense and natural affection of Shaftesbury at the bottom. In the mind of Shaftesbury, there lived, of course, the same concept of man and view of life and the world that was cherished by Stoics, Plato or the thinkers of the Renaissance. To put in brief, dwelling in this universe is the soul that gives life to everything, and nature has limitless essential qualities. It is an order and an orderly organic system. This harmonious system of the macrocosm asserts itself in the microcosm or the inner structure of man at the same time.<sup>5)</sup> Conversely speaking, there lives within man the fundamental 'Lebensgefühl' tending towards harmony, and this brings about the peaceful harmony of the outer world and puts nature in good order. In other words, nature is impersonated by the enrichment of inner life. Thus, "Das Beste kam ihm aus der eigenen Seele, welche überall nur ihren Einklang mit ihrer Umgebung empfand. ....Die innere kraft, sich sich selbst zu gestalten zu einer harmonischen Persönlichkeit und dann das Vernehmen dieser Harmonie in sich selbst-hierin lebte er!"<sup>6)</sup> Indeed, lying hidden at the basis of the moral sense of Shaftesbury were the order of the system of cosmos, and the harmony effected by the projection of this order into the personality of man, or we may as well say that the harmonious life of man subject caught the harmonious rhythm of his personality in external nature. Such a view of the universe was supporting his moral sense from behind. Therefore, as it is often said, we must call it a superficial way of viewing things if one interpretes the moral philosophy of Shaftesbury as materialism in the sense that it is opposed to spiritualism or as an altruistic theory as opposed to an egocentric theory.

Perhaps this is what Troeltsch called 'Harmonie des Weltorganismus'.<sup>7)</sup> If man were endowed with harmonious order like this in his personality,

3) Shaftesbury, A. A. C., "An Inquiry concerning Virtue, or Merit," *Characteristics of Man, Manners, Opinions, Times*, Vol. II, (1711), Treatise IV, p. 5-7.

4) Troeltsch, E., "Die englischen Moralisten des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts," *op. cit.*, SS. 375.

5) *Ibid.*, S. 373.

6) Dilthey, W., "Aus der Zeit der Spinozasstudien," *Weltanschauung und Analyse des Menschen seit Renaissance und Reformation*, (Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. II), S. 399.

7) Troeltsch, E., "Die englischen Moralisten des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts," *op. cit.*, SS. 420-1.

and if the order were morally good, it must be beautiful at the same time. If man were born capable of seeking harmony and pointing to goodness, he would have aesthetic faculty as well as boniform faculty at the same time. It is characteristic of Shaftesbury that in such a harmonious personality were aesthetic feeling and ethical feeling linked together. Taylor saw the aesthetic faculty or the intuitive feeling of Shaftesbury in Newton or Henry Moore who was a Cambridge Platonist. "The Newtonian system of the physical universe seemed a revelation of a beautiful and marvelous, self-maintaining, harmonious order of physical laws and processes", and there we could witness the works of God, the 'planner' of all nature. And Moore seems to have sought this harmony in human life or human feelings. Moore called it 'intuitive aesthetic-ethical sense' and emphasized it as a natural feeling of mankind. He held such feelings "to be the sources of man's potential, natural knowledge of and delighted in the realm of all real, objective values and the possibilities of ideal harmony as the goals of all the fine arts. And the sublimest of all was nothing else than 'the art of living the good life'. The man's inborn faculty of discriminating and loving such a realistic, and possible form of harmony was nothing but 'the boniform faculty'.<sup>8)</sup> If so, we may safely say that the moral sense of Shaftesbury was also innate in human nature as the aesthetic faculty, and was the vital force of loving harmony in human life and social life, acting as the inborn faculty of all human beings.

Now, it will be necessary for us to turn to the genealogy of Shaftesbury's ideas in relation to John Locke, because it is generally admitted that the English Enlightenment was established on the basis of Locke's system of philosophy, hence all ideas that came into flower in the eighteenth century originated with Locke in some way or other.<sup>9)</sup> Besides, Shaftesbury enjoyed a close intimacy with Locke until the death of the latter in 1704, as it will be discussed in the next chapter. Their relations were not of ordinary ones, however. Taking service with Lord Shaftesbury, the grand-father of our Shaftesbury at first, Locke was the family physician when Shaftesbury, the was born. Moreover, Locke was the tutor of young Shaftesbury, and continued to be a good adviser to him on any matter concerning thoughts, political affairs and health until he died in 1704. From his personal relations with Shaftesbury alone, it is quite obvious that we cannot discuss Shaftesbury without referring to Locke. As you can see from what we have said above, Shaftesbury was greatly influenced by Locke in his ideas, while there

8) Taylor, O. H., *A History of Economic Thought; Social Ideas and Economic Theories from Quesnay to Keynes* (New York, 1960), pp. 30-5.

9) Willey, B., *Seventeenth Century Background*.

were some aspects in which he refused Locke through and through. To put it in another way, there coexisted in Locke many-sided characteristics of the eighteenth century modernism incompatible with one another, which very fact characterizes Locke as the starting-point of the eighteenth century thinking. If we beat the trouble of borrowing a diagrammatical expression, we can see in Locke a sensualist's image of man originating with Hobbes on one hand, and the internal sense of introspection similar to that of Cambridge Platonists on the other hand. These two elements stood together to help forming empirism peculiar to Locke, and served as the basis of the modern ideas of natural law. That is the reason why he was saved from imaging a irrational man in the state of nature as Hobbes did, or from making a sort of compromise with the old system of society as it was the case with Cambridge Platonists, and consequently was successful in providing a philosophical weapon that helped the formation of a new civil society.<sup>10)</sup> It is needless to say that as long as Locke refused the inborn sense or the a priori knowledge concerning morals, Shaftesbury's a priori moral sense was incompatible with Locke's way of thinking.<sup>11)</sup> Besides, inasmuch as Locke accepted the sensualism or the individualistic view of society of Hobbes, Shaftesbury's natural social feelings of man should have been different in character from Locke's. On the other hand, Locke's man had reason or the power of reflexion, either of which is different from such elements, and therefore it is quite possible that these faculties had something to do with the intuitive aesthetic faculty or the moral sense of Shaftesbury.<sup>12)</sup> Therefore, the enlightenment thought of Shaftesbury became the philosophical foundation of English social sciences in just the same manner as Locke's recognition of social freedom or social personality in human nature served as the driving force to promote the formation of bourgeois society.

So far we have traced the genealogy of Shaftesbury's ideas, touched upon their relations to the Enlightenment thoughts, especially that of England, and finally seen the continuity and discontinuity of their relations to Locke's ideas. Then, what characters or what kind of structure did the moral philosophy of Shaftesbury with such ideological genealogy have? In tracing his ideologscal lineage, we already touched upon some of the important elements constituting Shaftesbury's ideas. What is important for us now is the question of how these elements were interwoven into his ideas. Shaftesbury was not a thinker who constructed an idea in a systematic and logical fashion, but he was very much intuitive minded, and voiced his ideas in

10) Troeltsch, E., "Die englischen Moralisten des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts," *op. cit.*, S. 421.

11) Bonar, J., *Moral Sense* (London, 1930), pp. 19-20.

12) Taylor, H. T., *op. cit.*, p. 31.

fragments everywhere. This fact makes it even more necessary for us to reconstruct his ideas from within and show the structure in three dimensions. By doing so, we are hoping to reconfirm the positive significance of his contribution as the founder of moral philosophy in the period of enlightenment. We also attempt to ascertain the limitations of Shaftesbury who was attacked by Mandeville and others for the very reason that Shaftesbury criticised Hobbes or Puritanism and established moral sense of his own. These efforts will make us able to make clear the position or type of Shaftesbury's ideas in the entire picture of the eighteenth century English Enlightenment. We may also be able to show somehow the problems involved in the English enlightenment thoughts, including that of Mandeville at the same time.

## II. Life of Shaftesbury

Before discussing Shaftesbury's ideas, let us look at his life briefly. It is because an idea of a thinker has a close connection with his circumstances, educational background and experiences, and an account of his life will surely help a better understanding of his idea. It is necessary all the more because Shaftesbury is not known well in our country. The genealogy of his ideas that has been discussed in the preceding chapter suggests that it is rather appropriate for us to focus our attention on the Renaissance culture or his connections with Locke and some people representing natural theology.

The Shaftesbury was a noble family of England. It seems that they were statesmen generation after generation. Even since Anthony Ashley Cooper Shaftesbury, First Earl (1621-83) was conferred the title of Earl in 1672, his descendants called themselves Second Earl, Third Earl, Fourth Earl, and so forth. The most famous of all in English history were First Earl, Third Earl, and Seventh Earl of Shaftesbury. First Earl of Shaftesbury was a most prominent English politician who, leading the Whig before the Glorious Revolution, antagonized the Catholic Duke of York, a brother of King, (James II later) and his supporters, and who took part in the planning of the scheme for legitimizing the King's bastard son, the duke of Monmouth. Seventh Earl (1801-85) was a progressive social reformer although he belonged to the Tory, and made a great contribution to the improvement of the social condition of the working classes through the legislation of the Factory act of 1833, the Protection of Coal Miners Bill of 1844, the Ten Hours Bill of 1847, and so forth.

The philosopher Shaftesbury who is prominent in the history of the Enlightenment, and who is the subject of our present study, is Third Earl of Shaftesbury. He was born on February 26, 1671, at Exeter House, London,



the residence of his grandfather. He was the son of Second Earl of Shaftesbury, needless to say, and Lady Dorothy Manners, daughter of Earl of Rutland. Now, what is interesting to us is the relations of John Locke and Shaftesbury. Making the acquaintance of First Earl of Shaftesbury in 1666, Locke took service with Shaftesbury as the attending physician as a friend, and as the tutor.<sup>1)</sup> Through his association with First Earl of Shaftesbury, not only did Locke learn about politics, but also he was greatly influenced by Shaftesbury's ideas in his preparation of *Essay concerning Toleration*, which was an epoch-making work, marking the development of his ideas, it is told. In answer to patronage of the Shaftesbury, Locke spared no pains in doing whatever he could in the interest of the family. Because his father had a weak constitution and lacked intelligence, his grandfather asked Locke to be the tutor of his father and even entrusted him with task of choosing the bride of his father in 1669. Thus, Locke arranged the match of his parents. Later Locke worked for his mother, and attended as the body physician when our Shaftesbury was born. Not to speak of his grandfather and his father, our Shaftesbury was under the care of Locke since his birth in 1671.<sup>2)</sup> When he was in his childhood, he was under the protection of his grandfather because his father was disabled. Locke was in charge of his education. It is told that Locke educated this child in accordance with his principles set forth in his *Some Thoughts concerning Education*.<sup>3)</sup> In 1674 Locke commissioned an Elisabeth, a female tutor, to teach Shaftesbury Greek and Latin. Having an aptitude for these classic languages, Elisabeth did herself justice by skillful teaching, living with her pupil. Locke also took kindly a practical interest in Shaftesbury so much as he took the trouble of securing a Latin textbook during his visit of France in 1677 or called on Shaftesbury frequently. It is extremely important for our present study that Shaftesbury received his baptism of Lockian enlightenment ideas since his childhood, and that he was steeped in Greek and Roman ideas. We regret to say, however, that we have few historical records that would give us detailed information concerning what books he was fond of specifically or what subjects of study was he interested in. For all that we can readily guess how important influence did the application of the knowledge obtained from the study of these classic languages and Locke's *Some Thoughts concerning Education* have in preparing the ground for the development of Shaftesbury's ideas.

After his grandfather died while staying in Holland in 1683, his parents

1) Aaron, R. I., *John Locke*, (Oxford, 1955), p. 15.

2) Cranston, M., *John Locke* (London, 1957), p. 111.

3) *Some Thoughts concerning Education* (1693).

took him away from the supervision of Locke and sent him to a school in Winchester. He studied there for three years, but he was cruelly treated by his school friends in retribution for the political misfortune of his grandfather who fled from his own country for his Whig position or his involvement in the rebellion of the Duke of Monmouth. Shaftesbury who was then suffering very much there set out on his first trip abroad with his lifelong intimate friends John Cropley and Thomas Sclater Bacon in November 1686, and had a chance to observe Italy, Germany and France. We know little about the results of his trip, but it may not be wrong to suppose that he learned a lot of things useful for his study after his return to his country as it is told that he was extremely interested in arts during his stay in Italy.<sup>4)</sup> It is equally conceivable that the Renaissance culture that captivated him should have helped forming the frame-work of Shaftesbury's ideas in a great measure.

Shaftesbury returned to his country in 1689 when the Glorious Revolution was over. He continued his study for a while, but on May 21, 1695, he was elected a member of the Second Parliament of William from Poole, and was reelected from the same constituency on November 4, 1695 after the dissolution of the parliament in the fall. It is needless to say that Shaftesbury inherited his grandfather's political stand, and fought for the freedom of the nation and for the independence of the parliament, from his Whig position. There is an episode of Shaftesbury which tells us vividly the individuality of this uncommon statesman. Up until that age, a mutineer was never allowed to have a counsel to defend himself in an English court, but a bill intended to reform it was introduced to the Lower House, and Shaftesbury was asked to give a speech in favor of the bill. In the midst of his speech, he got confused and sunk down on the floor. The House encouraged him to continue his speech. He impressed all the House greatly by saying "If I am so confounded by a first speech that I cannot express my thoughts, what must be the condition of a man pleading for his life without assistance"<sup>5)</sup> When he spoke that much, the House was struck with him and passed the bill. In this episode we can see how witty he was and how much did he fight for the rights of the nation. We can also see in it that he was not suited to a politician in any way. In fact, he did not show much interest even when then the Whig party was gaining predominating influence, and he quitted the stage of politics after the dissolution of the parliament in 1698, partly due to his bad health. Nevertheless, the death of his father in the following year put him back into the world of politics

4) Willey, B., *Eighteenth Century Background* (1957), p. 57.

5) Bonar, J., *op. cit.*, p. 23.

as Lord Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury. This time, he did his best for the Whig party. On the occasion of Anne's accession to the throne in 1702, he entered a private life, and chose quiet study and a small circle of acquaintance rather than political fame or ambition.

Shaftesbury was a man of culture before anything else. He was an enlightenment philosopher who lived in the European world. No sooner did he quit the stage of politics in 1698 than he left for Holland, where he stayed with a Quaker merchant Benjamin Furly (with whom Locke was also staying) for a year. It is said that it was during his stay with this merchant that he formed the acquaintance of Pierre Bayle (1647-1706) and Le Clerc (1557-1736). It seems that Shaftesbury was influenced greatly by these men who respected the freedom of religion and advocated natural religion based on reason against supernatural revelation religion. It was during this period that his first and most important book called "An Inquiry concerning Virtue, or Merit" was written. It was published by his friend Toland without the author's permission in the following year (1699). Following the period of his return to political life between 1699 and 1702, he went over to Holland again from 1703 through 1704. Macaulay called this trip of Shaftesbury "an intellectual luxury". This kind of life seemed to be most congenial to his taste. During this period his association with Locke remained unchanged. Even after Locke moved to Oates to rest himself quiet, Shaftesbury visited him frequently. It appears that Locke was also associated with Le Clerc, Newton as well as Lord Somers. In 1692 Locke sent his "*The Third Letter concerning Toleration*" to these people as Shaftesbury. Shaftesbury made that trip abroad in 1703 "probably on Locke's advice".<sup>6)</sup>

But this foreign travel could not cure his bad health, either. After he stayed one year, he had to leave Holland due to asthma. He returned home but could not bear the fog of London. So he went to Betchworth to live with the Kropley and moved again to Hampstead in 1706. In August 1709 he married Jane, daughter of Thomas Ewer of Lee of Hardfordshire, but it was not his choice. He did marry partly because he was obliged to accept the advice of his friend Robert Molesworth. The purpose of marriage was nothing but to succeed to his family name and to give satisfaction to his friend who took care of him in his home life. There was no sign of his particular interest in this marriage. Meanwhile, Shaftesbury concentrated on creative thinking and produced some important works. Aside from the preface he wrote for "Select Sermons" by Dr. Whichcote, a Cambridge Platonist, published in 1698 and his maiden work published by Toland without

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6) Cranston : *op. cit.*, p. 472.

his consent, which we referred to above, Shaftesbury himself did not publish any book before 1708. In 1708, Shaftesbury made public anonymously "A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm" for the first time in his life. In May 1709 "Sensus Communis, An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour" appeared, and then, his second great work "The Moralist, a Philosophical Rhapsody" followed close behind it. All these separate treatises were put together into a three-volume complete collection under the title of "Characteristic of Man, Manners, Opinions, Times" in 1711.

He declined in health rather rapidly after the publication of this collection in 1711. So he left with his wife for Napoli, a warmer place for a change of air, and spent the rest of his life there in peace. It goes without saying that the life in Italy filled with ancient and Renaissance culture as the great self-sacrificing devotion of his wife beside a sickbed brought him the greatest happiness and satisfaction. He passed away on February 15, 1713 in this spiritual mother country.

### III. Harmony of World Organism

We have traced up the genealogy of Shaftesbury's moral philosophy, and sought its origin in ancient philosophy and the conception of the world of the Renaissance. And we made it clear how was it related to currents of thoughts of the seventeenth century. In other words, we have touched upon such points as how did he antagonize Puritanism or Hobbes on one hand and how was he opposed with the natural theology of Cambridge Platonists on the other hand, and finally in what fashion did the English Enlightenment change from the seventeenth to the eighteenth century by way of seeing his relations with Locke with whom he was associated through his life in all phases of life. To look into the contents of Shaftesbury's ideas, he objected Puritanism's distrust in man, and was fully convinced of that man's real nature is morally good. To him, such altruistic feelings as friendship or brotherhood, indeed, are the most natural feelings, only too natural to mankind. Therefore, men with such natural feelings can form certain social relations with one another without denying their own nature. In this respect, Shaftesbury's image of man was the opposite of Hobbes' image of man. In fact, towards Shaftesbury was fooling Hobbes and Hobbians who denied any natural feeling tending justice or common goodness with man's real nature, saying as follows: "We are beholden to you for your Instruction. .... Is there then such a thing as natural affection? If not, why all this Pains, why all this Danger on our account? Why not keep this Secret to Yourself? Of what advantage is it to You, to deliver us from the Cheat? The more are taken in it, the

better. 'Tis directly against Your Interest to undeceive Us, and let us know that only private Interest governs You. .... Leave us to ourselves, and to that notable Art by which we are happily tam'd, and render'd thus mild and sheepish. 'Tis not fit we shou'd know that by Nature we are all Wolves."<sup>1)</sup> Thus, Shaftesbury overturned the human nature of Leviathan, admitted that there dwells in human nature itself innate feelings called the social affection, and regarded its realization as the basis of the human society.

Now, when we probe deeply into the thought of Shaftesbury who denied Puritan or Hobbian image of man and declared to be the 'friend of men', we can see that his moral philosophy is supported by the conception of the world or of nature given the term of "Harmonie des Weltorganismus". The cosmos and all beings therein are full of life and in perfect order. The whole cosmos outside man preserves harmonious order, while man, the child of the cosmos, maintains harmony and proportion in himself likewise. Or we may as well speak by the mouth of Dilthey; "Die innere Kraft, sich selbst zu gestalten zu einer harmonischen Persönlichkeit und dann das Vernehen dieser Harmonie in sich selbst—hierin lebte er."<sup>2)</sup> In other words, there lives within the personality of man his fundamental Lebensgefühl termed the boniform faculty, and the realization of this Lebensgefühl brings the world or society in good order. In fine, there is harmony and balance between macrocosmos and microcosmos, and between the inside and the outside of man, and these opposites form the overall system of the cosmos, one supplementing the other. Now, let us see how.

In the beginning of his "An Inquiry concerning Virtue, or Merit", Shaftesbury wrote as follows: "In the Whole of Things (or in the Universe) either all is according to a good Order, and the most agreeable to a general Interest: or there is that which is otherwise, and might possibly have been better constituted, more wisely contriv'd and with more advantage to the general Interest of Beings, or of the Whole."<sup>3)</sup> In other words, there is a system of all things or a universal system in this universe, where a part connects with the whole, and an individual loses its *raison d'être* if it gets separated from the organic whole. Each system can preserve harmonious order by forming mutual relations of the parts and the whole, and in this way can each and all beings accomplish their own purposes and contribute to common goodness. As for the mutual relations, Shaftesbury talked to

1) Shaftesbury, "Sensus Communis: An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour (1709)," *Characteristics*, Vol. 1, pp. 92-3.

2) Troeltsch, E., "Die englischen Moralisten des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts," *op. cit.*, SS. 451-2.

3) Dilthey, W., "Aus der Zeit der Spinozasstudien," *Weltanschauung und Analyse des Menschen seit Renaissance und Reformation*, ( *Gesammelte Schriften*, Bd. II), S. 399.

4) Shaftesbury, "An Inquiry concerning Virture or Merit," *Characteristics*, Vol. II, p. 9.

himself as follows: "How hard it is to give the least account of a particular, part, without a competent knowledge of the whole." Indeed, we can see in many living things how important a bearing have their frames and the proportions of parts in their structures upon their respective purposes. Such a conception of harmonious order of a system is probably an idea of a teleological system of the universe. The harmonious relations of parts and the whole constitute an essential feature of "the common structure and system of man and nature".

To consolidate Shaftesbury's view regarding the relations of parts to the whole of the world organism or the proportion of an individual and the species, there are two types. The first type may be called the harmony or proportion among various systems. In other words, the whole system of cosmos embraces the plant system, the animal system, the human system, the earth system and the like, and each of these systems belongs to respective species. And in this case each system depends upon one another or is woven into a larger system one over another, and a certain species concerns the object of another species. By way of example, Shaftesbury speaks of a case, in which an animal is subservient to the existence of other creatures, and is, like other creatures, endowed with all the conditions necessary for its living: "For instance; To the Existence of the Spider. that of the Fly is absolutely necessary. The heedless Flight, weak Frame, and tender Body of this latter Insect, fits and determines him as much a Prey, as the rough Make, Watchfulness, and Cunning of the Former, fits him for Rapine, and the ensnaring part. The Web and Wing suited to each other. And in the Structure of each of these Animals, there is as apparent and perfect a relation to the other, as in our own Bodys there is a relation of Limbs and Organs. .... In the same manner are Flys also necessary to the Existence of other Creatures, both Fowls and Fish. And thus are other Species or Kinds subservient to one another; as being Parts of a certain System, and included in one and the same Order of Beings."<sup>5)</sup> Thus, the animal system is according to a good order of its own just as the plant system is according to a good order of its own, and in each system any part of it concerns the whole. The same thing can be said as to the relation of a plant and an animal. And all these systems join to form the system of a universal nature,<sup>7)</sup> and this mutual dependence is the common nature of things.

The system of the organic world can be seen not only in the relations of the first type, but also in the relations among the same species or kind.

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5) *Ibid.*, pp. 14-5.

6) *Ibid.*, pp. 18-9.

7) *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

The second type is a kind of relation between one and species (kind), and perhaps it had a greater significance than the former for Shaftesbury. What is important for us here is not the mutual interdependence of one species and another, but that of one as being a part of a species and the whole species. That is, one is always in good harmony with the whole species, and receives life as long as it maintains that relation. Referring to some animals by way of example, he says as follows: "At a time of danger, when the whole Herd flies, the Bull alone makes head against the Lion, or whatever other invading Beast of Prey, and shews himself conscious of his Make. Even the Female of this kind is arm'd, we see, by Nature, in some degree, to resist Violence; so as not to fly a common Danger. .... But for Creatures who are able to make Resistance, and are by Nature arm'd offensively; be they of the poorest Insect-kind, such as Bees or Wasps; 'tis natural to 'em to be rous'd with Fury, and at the hazard of their Lives, oppose any Enemy or Invader of their Species. For by this known Passion in the Creature, the Species itself is secured; when by Experience 'tis found that the Creature, tho unable to repel the Injury, yet voluntarily exposes his Life for the Punishment of the Invader; and suffers not his kind to be injur'd with Impunity"<sup>8)</sup> Many creatures are by nature armed constitutionally in some form or other for the protection of the whole species, thus one is always related to the whole species. It is interesting to note that the same relation of one and its species can clearly be observed in men as well. Shaftesbury continues to say: "Man in this Sense the most formidable: since if he thinks it just and exemplary, he may possibly in his own, or in his Country's Cause, revenge an Injury on any-one living; and by throwing away his own Life (if he be resolute to that degree) is almost certain Masters of anothers, however strongly guarded."<sup>9)</sup>

Now, if someone that one can receive life only as long as it is related to the whole species (kind), you would immediately be reminded of the medieval organism. It is true that Shaftesbury's ideas have a shade of social organism when considered in the light of the principles of modern natural law, according to which man became independent from communal society, and the natural rights of this individual man helped establishing bourgeois society. However, the English Enlightenment that had gone through the bourgeois revolution was not a simple return to the medieval ages, because Shaftesbury did perceive the life of individuality of one living within the whole very distinctly. He considered that it was from the spontaneous impulse of its own that one concerns the whole or the system

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8) *Ibid.*, pp. 93-4.

9) *Ibid.*, pp. 94.

of a species, and by this alone could the life of one be vitalized. It is especially true with man who is a rational creature having an impulse of concerning himself to the whole and of conducting himself on such an emotion. Thus, Shaftesbury greatly respected the humanity of an individual as such, and insisted that it is the type of a modern man. "If Eating and Drinking be natural, Herding is so too. If any Appetite or Sence be natural, the Sence of Fellowship is the same."<sup>10</sup> In this phrase we can find his trust in the goodness of human nature, and with this trust could he establish the moral of the Enlightenment. We will see in a more concrete form Shaftesbury's conception of man and the cosmos in the following chapter dealing moral sense. Here I just want to confirm the point that the relation of one and the whole was not considered from the side of the whole alone, but from the other side of one as well. It was the self-assertion of the humanity of an individual.

Such a conception of the world conceived by Shaftesbury was supported by his idea of harmony that be it one and its species or a part and the whole, the can be said to be natural only if they are in good harmony. One concerns itself with the whole because by so doing it can bring about a harmonious order. If this harmony be once broken, what significance can we expect to find there? "Upon the whole; It may be said properly to be the same with the Affection or Passions in an Animal-Constitution, as with the Cords or Strings of a musical Instrument. If these, tho in ever so just proportion one to another, are strain'd beyond a certain degree, 'tis more than the Instrument will bear: The Lute or Lyre is abus'd, and its Effect lost."<sup>11</sup> Hence, however good is a feeling or action considered to be, it becomes unnatural when it goes beyond a certain limit. Nay, such an excessive feeling or action is evil because they break the harmony. So, we see different species of creatures require strings of different strains. "Even in the same Species of Creatures one is not entirely like the other, nor will the same Strings fit each."<sup>12</sup> At any rate, strings of proper strains meant harmony, and were the basic requirement of goodness. Moreover, a harmonious relation of a part and the whole or of one and its species, a harmonious proportion or composition of an individual itself, all of these are beaties at the same time. Once one loses this proportion, it turns an evil or an ugly. "The Shapes, Motions, Colours, and Proportions of these latter being presented to our Eye; there necessarily results a Beauty of Deformity, according to the different measure, Arrangement and Disposition of their

10) Shaftesbury, *Characteristics*, Vol. 1, p. 110.

11) Shaftesbury, "An Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit," *Characteristics*, Vol. II, pp. 94-5.

12) *Ibid.*, p. 95.



several Parts. .... The Mind feels the Soft and Harsh, the Agreeable and Disagreeable, in the Affections; and finds a Foul and Fair, a Harmonious and a Dissonant, as really and truly here, as in any musical Numbers, or in the outward Forms or Representations of sensible Things. .... So that to deny the common and natural Sense of Sublime and Beautiful in Things, will appear an Affectation merely, to anyone who considers duly of this Affair."<sup>13)</sup>

Of course it by no means that such is nature common to all creatures and is given empirically and immediately to human nature, on the ground that Shaftesbury's ideas are characterized by aesthetic beauties like these. Remember that human nature was once made barbarous by accepted religions or by misconducts of man called a rational creature. In actuality, some people or tribes are blinded by avarice or driven by aspiration after fame, or demoralized.<sup>14)</sup> That's why Shaftesbury was imposed the historical task of protecting human nature against these evils. And that's why Shaftesbury set moral human nature against this type of human nature, and sought the significance of the Enlightenment in leading the latter to the former, that is, guiding human nature from darkness to light assuming that however evil-natured, a man is born capable of distinguishing and selecting the good from the bad, and discerning harmonious and proportioned things. This is nothing but the moral sense or nature of man. If men can realize this sense, they can establish justice and order. Shaftesbury firmly believed that this could be done.

#### IV. The Frame of Shaftesbury Moral Sense

In the external world enveloping man as well as in the internal world of man himself there is harmony, and it is the aesthetic faculty of mankind to catch the harmonious rhythms to be heard in these worlds. It is the moral sense of man which enables him to discern good from bad, and directs him towards goodness. What is characteristic of Shaftesbury in this case is the view that he looked upon such ability as sense or affection, and not as reason. We have to note, however, that in classical German philosophy either sense or affection was distinguished from reason whereas in Shaftesbury's phraseology both of these words were backed by reason. This means that Shaftesbury was following the wake of traditional English empiricism. "So that in a sensible Creature, that which is not done thro any Affection at all, makes neither Good nor Ill in the nature of that Creature. .... It is

13) *Ibid.*, pp. 28-9.

14) *Ibid.*, pp. 33-4.

therefore by Affection merely that a Creature is esteem'd good or ill, natural or unnatural."<sup>1)</sup> This affection is nothing else than Dilthey's 'Lebensgefühl' or the most original faculty of man to perceive the harmony and proportions both inside and outside human nature. Now, the affection is most strong in man, or we would rather say it is an outstanding characteristic of man to be allowed such affection, because man is such a creature that can not only perceive the outward beings but also can sense the affection itself. Shaftesbury called this man's inherent affection 'the reflex affection', saying: "But to proceed from what is esteem'd mere Goodness, and lies within the reach and capacity of all sensible Creatures, to that which is call'd Virtue or Merit, and is allow'd to man only. In a Creature capable of forming general Notions of Things, not only the outward Beings which offer themselves to the Sense, are the Objects of the Affection, but the very Actions themselves, and the Affections of Pity, Kindness, Gratitude, and their Contraries, being brought into the Mind by Reflection, become Objects. So that, by means of this reflected Sense, there arises another kind of Affection towards those very Affections themselves which have been already felt, and are now become of the Subject of a new Liking or Dislike."<sup>2)</sup> It is evident from this statement that Shaftesbury's moral sense is an affection allowed only to man, the reasonable creature; it is an affection refined by reason. From that statement we can see at the same time that Locke's category of reason and reflection was sublimated into Shaftesbury's moral sense. Of course we cannot equate Shaftesbury's moral sense to Locke's category as long as Locke does not accept that a priori proposition even with respect to morality. When Shaftesbury said "Sense of Right and Wrong being as natural to us as natural Affection itself, and being a first Principle in our Constitution and Make",<sup>3)</sup> such a view would never be in accord with Locke's criticism of the innate ideas that he so strongly denied. But we must doubt very much whether Locke could deny the human nature capable of discerning good and bad or beauty and deformity behind the epistemological subject that organizes knowledge.<sup>4)</sup>

Anyhow, what is important for us now is the point that man having not only sensual affections but also reflex affections forms a moral judgment of good and bad, or right and wrong, and has a moral sense guiding him towards good and right as a common sense, and how this inherent sense of man become a principle in the formation of our society. In other words,

1) Shaftesbury, *Characteristics*, Vol II. An Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit. pp. 21-2.

2) Shaftesbury, *ibid.*, p. 28.

3) Shaftesbury, *ibid.*, p. 44.

4) Taylor, O. H., *A History of Economic Thought*, Social Ideas and Economic Theories from Quesnay to Keynes, p. 33.

we have to trace Shaftesbury's enlightenment ideas to his concept of the internal structure of the feelings-possessed subject (the frame of moral sense) and ascertain the connection it may have with the objective society. It has been stated several times already that the intrinsic nature of man's affections is friendly and sociable, hence the spontaneous realization of the natural affections of man is the key to the formation of our society. In this point Shaftesbury's ideas are opposed to those of Hobbes and Mandeville who held that egoism is the intrinsic nature of man, and tried to build our society on this theory. It is true and correct that Shaftesbury considered the social affection pointing to the good of the public as a natural affection of man, and built his moral sense upon it. Nevertheless, Shaftesbury did not take human nature as so simple a thing as this. In fact, human affections are extremely intricate and various; all sorts of affections splitting, blending, or standing against one another. It is moral sense that is capable of finding a certain kind of harmony in these opposing human affections. It is the very element to which Shaftesbury's ideas can be reduced.

Now, let us see how it works. Shaftesbury classified human affections into three kinds. The first one is the social affection which we have discussed already. It is "the natural affections, which lead to the Good of the Publick."<sup>5)</sup> Under this heading come friendship, kindness, modesty, love, and such other affections that may benefit others, help others or render service to others. In other words, it is "an unselfish, altruistic affection". It is needless to say that this affection is innate in man. But a real man living in the actual world does not act on the impulse of this affection alone. Instead, he has an urge to preserve himself. Hence, as the second important human affection, we can name "the Self-Affections which lead only to the Good of the Private." We may call this kind of affection a "selfish affection" seeking self-interest or craving. Should the affection hurt others or public welfare, it is not only harmful, but also is ruinous to his own happiness. If the affection is kept with a proper limit, it is not injurious. "A moderate self-affection is harmless". Finally, there is the third one which does not lead to the private good nor the public good. Shaftesbury called it "the unnatural affection". Such affections as we call misanthropy, oppression or defamation belong to this category. None of them will be good for the man himself, but what is more, they will the life of a victim into the depth of misery for ever. They are injurious affections in any circumstance.

Of these three kinds of affections, "the unnatural affection" was not

5) Shaftesbury, *ibid.*, pp. 86-7.

discussed so much by Shaftesbury. Suffice it to say that although the affection was and is frequently seen in man, it does not arise from any cause attributable to human nature, but from a historical point of view, it often grew out of ignorance, superstition or bad environment. Therefore, the affection is bound to be corrected before long.<sup>6)</sup> What is important for us now is the relations of the social affection and the self-affection, both arising from human nature. We must see how these two kinds of affections go well together in Shaftesbury's ideas. As it is clear from his classification of affections, Shaftesbury did not deny unconditionally the affection leading to the good of the private, but admitted that it originated in nature of man and must sometimes be acknowledged absolutely necessary. He said, "If the Affection towards private or Self-good, however selfish it may be esteem'd, is in reality not only consistent with publick Good, but in some measure contributing to it; if it be such, perhaps, as for the Good of the Species in general, every individial ought to share: 'tis so far from being ill, or blameable in any sense, that it must be acknowledg'd absolutely necessary to constitute a Creature Good. For if the want of such an Affection as that towards Self-preservation, be injurious to the Species; a Creature is ill and unnatural as well thro this Defect, as thro the want of any other natural affection."<sup>7)</sup> The meaning of this passage will become more clear if you think of a man making headway recklessly toward the edge of a precipice or of a man who is indifferent about the requisites of life such as food, clothing or shelter, and does not take care of his health. Or rather we should even admit that the affection towards private or self-good plays an important role in enhancing public good. "For tho no Creature can be call'd good, or virtuous, merely for possessing these affections; yet since it is impossible that the publick Good, or Good of the System, can be preserv'd without them; it follows that a Creature really wanting in them, is in reality wanting in some degree to Goodness and natural Rectitude; and may thus be esteem'd vitious and defective."<sup>8)</sup>

Now, let us take a look at the social affection which Shaftesbury called a natural affection innate in man. No man cannot be called virtuous unconditionally, merely for having this affection. In order for a man to be called good or virtuous, he has to meet different requirements. "That natural Affection may, in particular Cases, be excessive, and in an unnatural degree: As when Pity is so overcoming as to destroy its own End, and prevent the Succour and Relief requir'd; or as when Love to the Offspring proves such a Fondness as destroys the Parent, and consequently the Offspring

6) Shaftesbury, *ibid.*, p. 40.

7) Shaftesbury, *ibid.*, p. 23.

8) Shaftesbury, *ibid.*, p. 90.

itself. And notwithstanding it may seem harsh to call that unnatural and vitious, which is only an Extreme of some natural and kind Affection; yet 'tis most certain, that wherever any single good Affection of this sort is over-great, it must be injurious to the rest, and detract in some measure from their Force and natural Operation."<sup>9)</sup> We feel as if we are seeing in this passage an aspect which is entirely different from the original ideas of Shaftesbury. In other words, it appears that the social affection may sometimes become unnatural, while the self-affection, however selfish, must be acknowledged absolutely necessary to promote the good of the system. In fact, Shaftesbury was not so stiff-necked as to have a fixed idea of the social and the self-affections, persisting that one is good and the other is bad. It is all because we wanted to refuse such a superficial interpretation that we dared to make such a somewhat wordy description as that.

For all that, it does not mean that the self-affection was given a superior position over that of the social affection in Shaftesbury's ideas. We would rather say, as we did many times before, that the self-affection was admitted only as long as "it is consistent with public good, and in some measure contributing to it." "If this private Affection be too strong, then is it undoubtedly vitious; and if vitious, the Creature who is mov'd by it, is vitiously mov'd,"<sup>10)</sup> as we see, for example, when the love of life becomes too strong so that it does not go well with general behavior of a creature any longer. That is, if one private affection is too strong, it not only hurts another private affection, but also injures the social affection very often. Then, it becomes even more unnatural. "The more there is of this violent Affection towards private Good, the less room is there for the other sort towards Goodness itself, or any good and deserving Object, worthy of Love and Admiration for its own sake."<sup>11)</sup> Indeed, the social affection is natural in itself. "'Tis impssible to suppose a mere sensible Creature originally so ill-coustituted, and unnatural, as that from the moment he comes to be try'd by sensible Objects, he shou'd have no one good Passion towards his Kind, no foundation either of Pity, Love, Kindness, or social Affection."<sup>12)</sup>

Why is it, then, that the social affection suited so perfectly to human nature could sometimes be unnatural. This is the essential point, in which we are to find the key to Shaftesbury's ideas. Now, we must go back to the point that we have emphasized in the preceding chapter. We saw that Shaftesbury caught a dynamic phase of human nature in a man, within

9) Shaftesbury, *ibid.*, pp. 87-8.

10) Shaftesbury, *ibid.*, p. 24.

11) Shaftesbury, *ibid.*, p. 59.

12) Shaftesbury, *ibid.*, p. 43.

whom social affections and private affections were being entangled, and that he caught the rhythm of a harmonious whole there. Therefore, however sublime a passion or an affection may be, they must be unnatural and vitious, once they are "strain'd beyond their natural Proportion, and in too high a degree."<sup>13)</sup> If so, then what harmony? Needless to say, it is the harmony of the whole system. "To deserve the name of good or virtuous, a Creature must have all his Inclinations and Affections, his Dispositions of Mind and Temper, sutable, and agreeing with the Good of his Kind, or of that System in which he is included, and of which he constitutes a Part."<sup>14)</sup> Therefore, all social and natural affections were natural only as long as they concerned common nature or the system of mankind, and that only as long as they preserved harmony and did not impair the good of the system. Besides, it is what we called 'beauty' in the preceding chapter that various affections are in perfect proportion and keeping the system of mankind, hence the system of universal cosmos in good order. Such aesthetic faculty is moral sense; it is the faculty to perceive in human affections a tendency towards the common good of mankind.

If this is true, the social affection and the self-affection ought to be in perfect harmony essentially, without being antagonistic to each other. "That to be well affected towards the Publick Interest and one's own, is not only consistent, but inseparable: and that moral Rectitude, or Virtue, must accordingly be the Advantage, and Vice the Injury and Disadvantage of every Creature."<sup>15)</sup> If they do not consist with each other, we must say that they are abnormal and unnatural, and hence would lead to misfortune. If we accept the presumption "that the pursuing the common Interest or publick Good thro the Affections of one kind, must be a hindrance to the Affections of private Good thro the Affections of another",<sup>16)</sup> the hindrance, do matter what kind, is an "ill of the private state". Of course this wording was another expression of the protest against the distortion of human nature by the ills of the private state such as old religions, erroneous theories or despotism of the seventeenth century, just as much as it was an outlook of the newly emerging bourgeois class. Shaftesbury's image of society was a harmonious world of the social affection and the self-affection, in which these two were integrated into a harmonious whole through the medium of the common good of mankind, instead of running parallel with each other. That's why the natural affections affecting the whole society was called 'intire affection',

13) Shaftesbury, *ibid.*, p. 88.

14) Shaftesbury, *ibid.*, p. 77.

15) Shaftesbury, *ibid.*, p. 81.

16) Shaftesbury, *ibid.*, p. 111.

because the affections affecting the humankind or the whole society were representing the personality in its entirety, and not in part. Though equally called friendship, the kind of friendship which is devoted to some special group of people or is very capricious should be called 'partial affection'. "As it has no Foundation or Establishment in Reason; so it must be easily removable, and subject to alteration, without Reason." Hence, "Partial Affection is fitted only to a short and slender Enjoyment of those Pleasures of Sympathy or Participation with others."<sup>17)</sup> However, true love or the affections tending towards the good of the system are not so uncertain or capricious as that, but are more complete and constant. "Intire Affection as it is answerable to itself, proportionable, and rational; so it is irrefragable, solid, and durable."<sup>18)</sup> Viewed in this light, the key-note of Shaftesbury's ideas may safely be said to be found in the harmony-seeking aspect, but not in the easily splitting aspect of personality.

After tracing down human affections in this way, Shaftesbury explained happiness and pleasures as follows: when the social affections affecting the common good of mankind make harmonious development, they become natural and perfect. This is the process of realization of the original nature of man, and is a first principle having foundation in itself. Therefore, neither happiness nor pleasures should be explained separately from or in disregard of human nature, or attributed to self-affections. To have natural affections is to be happy in itself. "To have the natural Affections (such as are founded in Love, Complacency, Good-will, and in a Sympathy with the Kind or Species) is to have the chief Means and Power of Self-enjoyment: And to want them is certain Misery and Ill."<sup>19)</sup> It is a spiritual pleasure backed by reason, and not a sensual desire that drives man, the intellectual subject, to the highest passion beyond doubt. Affections arising from torments of starvation or solitude may certainly not bring any more sublime happiness than those fostered by friendly human relations do. "It will be consider'd how many the Pleasures are, of sharing Contentment and Delight with others; of receiving it in Fellowship and Company. .... So insinuating are these Pleasures of Sympathy, and so widely diffus'd thro our whole Lives."<sup>20)</sup>

Viewed in this light, the system of Shaftesbury's moral philosophy is "the scheme of moral arithmetick"<sup>21)</sup> that catches [the dynamic phase of the active relations between various affections of man, and reflects the

17) Shaftesbury, *ibid.*, p. 112.

18) Shaftesbury, *ibid.*, p. 111.

19) Shaftesbury, *ibid.*, p. 99.

20) Shaftesbury, *ibid.*, p. 108.

21) Shaftesbury, *ibid.*, p. 173.

construction of the harmonious world inside human nature. In correspondence with Descartes who established a legitimate order in the natural world, Shaftesbury established harmony and proportion within human nature as the foundation of moral sense. Any rational creature that has a good knowledge of principles of arithmetic must be able to see the natural order within human nature, that is, harmony, proportion, or agreement. And to follow this order is to realize human nature. "To have this Intire Affection or Integrity of Mind, is to live according to natural, and the Dictates and Rules of supreme Wisdom. This is Morality, Justice, Piety, and natural Religion."<sup>22)</sup>

## V. Critically-Viewed Outlook

In the foregoing chapters we have traced the descent of Shaftesbury's moral philosophy in the beginning, and then examined the contents of his thought. And we believe we could show that Shaftesbury had faith in the goodness of human nature, and solidified the foundation of human virtue by man's nature, and that his image of man was the bearer of the newly emerging bourgeois society. We agree very well with Willey that Shaftesbury was "the typical English moralist of the Enlightenment" and is worthy of being called "the founder of the moral sense school"<sup>1)</sup> in that he derived moral sense from the natural inner force of human life and established the independence of ethics from the existing religions. Needless to say, this means that rejecting Hobbesian or Puritan reprobation of man, Shaftesbury established a new type of human nature in opposition to theirs. Therefore, it was not necessary for him either to submit man's nature to the absolute will of God and restrict man by way of giving rewards or inflicting punishments of the supernatural being as Puritanism did, or to warrant the rationality of man by creating the authority of a monarch as the absolute being, as Hobbes did. To Shaftesbury, both the god of Puritanism and the monarch of Hobbes were nothing else than artificial products designed to tyrannize over man's nature and ought to be rejected. There is no room for good or virtue in it when one expects rewards or fears punishments in conformity with god's will or the law.<sup>2)</sup> In Shaftesbury's world, there existed no such power of God or the law. Instead, we could see in it his strong faith in human nature tending towards common good alone. It was not established things but natural things that is social and ethical-minded.

That he constituted harmony within the inner world of man and esta-

22) Shaftesbury, *ibid.*, pp. 114-5.

1) Willey, B., *The Eighteenth Century Background*, p. 58.

2) Shaftesbury, *Characteristics*, Vol. II. An Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit, p. 55.



blishing moral sense from that harmony means that he marked the turning point from the idea of natural law of the seventeenth century to the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. The epoch-making significance of it in the history of Enlightenment can be seen clearly in those facts that Shaftesbury's moral philosophy was introduced to France and gave a great influence upon Rousseau or Diderot, and that it paved the way for the English Enlightenment more than anything else, and helped Hutcheson and Smith to build the frameworks of their ideas. When Rousseau speaks of "two original things in human nature" in his '*Emile*', he apparently had on his mind something very similar in nature to Shaftesbury's self-affection and social affection. In other words, Rousseau's concept of love for humanity or sociability was not simply confined to that kind of man who "wishes his own happiness", the type we can see in ideas of the modern natural law, but it also implied the other kind who "wishes others to be happy just as well".<sup>3)</sup> Therefore, in Rousseau too, justice and society were based on natural affection that concerned the system of mankind and helped realizing the good of species. It needs no repetition here that Shaftesbury's concept of natural affection was later developed by Hutcheson into that of 'benevolence', and finally sublimated to Smith's world of "*The Theory of Moral Sentiments*". In his description of moral philosophy, Smith began with the principle of 'Sympathy' as the basis of his system. And it is nothing but Shaftesbury's ideas that was supporting that principle from behind.<sup>4)</sup> This by no means means that the concept of Rousseau or that of Smith was exactly identical with Shaftesbury's moral sense, not does it deny in any way the fact that Shaftesbury's moral sense was underlying the ideas of both Rousseau and Smith as a fundamental element.

Shaftesbury's moral philosophy had such significance in the history of Enlightenment, but in this case we should not overlook the fact that this side of his active contribution served as the limitation of his theory at the same time. Not only did human nature have sociability, but also it had a tendency to be selfish and drove man to pursue his own desires. Of course Shaftesbury accepted it as true, but he never approved it natural; much less did he admit that it would accord with social and public good unconditionally, and serve to enhance the latter. It was Mandeville, the author of "*Fable of the Bees*", who criticised this point thoroughly and contended that selfishness is the essential nature of man, and so the self-seeking impulse of man

3) *Emile* II, 259.

4) Smith, A., *The Theory of Moral Sentiment*, or An Essay towards an Analysis of the Principles by which Men naturally judge concerning the Conduct and Character, first of their Neighbours, and afterwards of themselves.

is the very principle of the formation of society.<sup>5)</sup> Stripping the veil from Shaftesbury's idealized image of sociable man, Mandeville laid bare the vicious nature innate in man, saying the best-cultured man of the world would never give others an enjoyment that would not reward his self-love, that is, an unself-centered enjoyment. Shaftesbury's image of sociable and harmonious man does more harm than good; it only makes the society to degenerate and does harm to the welfare of the whole mankind. His self-admiring golden mean and virtue of calmness that were encouraged so much in his "*Characteristics*" are good for nothing but to create idle men. Seen in this light, the impulse or desire of self-preservation which Mandeville called "more violent passion" may be called the prime force of social progress that drives man to be diligent. "What we call Evil in this World, moral as well as natural, is the grand Principle that makes us sociable Creatures, the solid Basis, the Life and Support of all Trades and Employments without Exception: There we must look for the true Origin of all Arts and Sciences, and the Moment Evil ceases, the Society must be spoiled, if not totally dissolved."<sup>6)</sup>

It is true that Shaftesbury made a great effort to establish the internal world of man, but he never showed what an objective world of modern society would it reflect.<sup>7)</sup> From the standpoint of the history of social thought we must call it a great defect that he did not touch upon the growing economic society at all. Furthermore, Shaftesbury totally ignored the Mandeville's aspect of the new bourgeoisie. Or we might say the lack of this aspect was the very characteristic of the world of Shaftesbury. To put it in another way, the harmonious man of virtue as idealized in his mind as the object of his aspiration was not the type to be found among working bourgeois in actual capitalistic society. Such an idealized man, if any, was to be found among the peerage or thinkers who, having given up the artificial careladen urban life, returned to nature and gave themselves over to deep contemplation. The author of "*An Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit*" was the same person who wrote "*The Moralist: a Philosophical Rhapsody*". In the latter book, Shaftesbury had Theocritus speak as follows: "Ye Fields and Woods, my Refuge from the toilsome World of Business, receive me in your quiet Sanctuarys, and favour my Retreat and thoughtful Solitude. — Ye verdant Plains, how gladly I salute ye! ..... Bless'd be ye chaste abodes of happiest Mortals, who here in peaceful Innocence enjoy a

5) Mandeville, B., *The Fable of the Bee, or Private Vices, Public Benefits*. Ed. by F. B. Kaye, Vol. 1. pp. 323-4.

6) Mandeville, *ibid.*, p. 369.

7) Shaftesbury, *ibid.*, p. 63.

Life unenvy'd, tho Divine; whilst with its bless'd Tranquillity it affords a happy Leisure and Retreat for Man."<sup>8)</sup> Now, what is extremely paradoxical is that Shaftesbury who gave emphasis to social man on one hand did enjoy immersion in nature or thoughtful solitude on the other hand, while Mandeville who asserted selfish man on one hand did arrive at men working hard in actual life for the improvement of human relations. From this we may conclude that Shaftesbury and Mandeville represented two opposite types of the eighteenth century English Enlightenment. When Shaftesbury spoke of those who were lost in meditation while they were taking a walk in the evening, wasn't he meaning few such enlightened men as used to converse among "Gentlemen and Friends who know one another perfectly well?"<sup>9)</sup>

If this is true, it must be shown the Shaftesbury was not followed closely by Smith nor Rousseau. Recognizing self-interest in the essential nature of man definitely, Smith admitted that it was the very element that helped building and advancing the bourgeois society. In this respect, Smith was a child of Mandeville. Or to speak more precisely, the two elements of Shaftesbury and Mandeville were consolidated in Smith. Likewise Rousseau was rooted in dissociation of human nature. Besides, his being one of a few blessed enlightened aristocratic thinkers very well corresponded to his being in the wake of ancient and Renaissance ideas. As we have said so many times, Shaftesbury was not a mere reactionary who longed for classical ideas. But as long as we limit ourselves to the aspect of his ideas that social affection is superior to self-affection, and that the perfect harmony of the whole system of universal cosmos is most essential, his was an idea of organism. Doesn't it give his enlightenment idea a character to be called "Enlightenment initiated from up above"?

Shaftesbury was "a friend of man" who believed in the goodness of human nature above the common run. It may safely be said that this had an epoch-making significance in the history of the eighteenth century Enlightenment. Even though it is admitted that the freedom of spirit or moral was enjoyed only by a small group of enlightened men of culture, this does not lessen in any way the significance he had in the history of ideas. Much less should we be justified in calling him a reactionary. To do justice to him, we must not overlook his positive contribution of having established a new model image of man for the eighteenth century, hence a new type of modern man, by denying the seventeenth century image of man. In

8) Shaftesbury, *The Moralists, a Philosophical Rhapsody. Being A Recital of certain Conversations on natural and moral Subjects.* p. 344.

9) Shaftesbury, *Essay on the Freedom of Wit,* p. 75.

addition to the importance of his ideas in the history of thought as seen above, we must note that Shaftesbury posed an important problem of the contradiction of dissociation and harmony of human nature for a better understanding of man in our day.